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Zen and Zarathustra
Self-Overcoming without a Self
André vAn der BrAAk  
ABstrAct: A confrontation with the Zen Buddhist tradition can help to open 
up new perspectives on Nietzsche’s thought that take us beyond the “familiar” 
Nietzsche. There are some gaps in most Nietzsche interpretations that could be 
fruitfully addressed by means of a comparison with East Asian thought. This 
article argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy and Zen philosophy can both be con-
sidered philosophies of self-overcoming in four different respects: theoretical, 
performative, self-referential, and expressive. In a theoretical sense, both stress 
the importance of self-overcoming. In a performative sense, both aim at self-
overcoming in the reader. In a self-referential sense, they continually overcome 
themselves as philosophy. In a self-expressive sense, both can be viewed as a 
celebration and expression of self-overcoming; they are philosophies of laugh-
ter and play. In reading Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, these four aspects 
meet each other.
keywords: Zen, self-overcoming, enlightenment, trAnsformAtions of the 
spirit, Zarathustra
Introduction to Nietzsche and East Asian Thought
East Asian philosophical traditions can be seen as “emerging traditions” that call for an engagement with Western philosophical thinkers. Nietzsche is a 
prime candidate for such an engagement. He can be considered a transcultural 
thinker who aimed to revitalize Western culture by using his self-proclaimed 
“trans-European eye” (KGW III.5, p. 221). Nietzsche was one of the few Western 
philosophers with an interest in non-Western philosophies, especially Buddhism, 
even if his familiarity with Buddhism was limited to early Buddhism,1 and his 
 understanding of Buddhism was marred by nineteenth-century preconceptions of 
Buddhism as a “cult of nothingness,” as Roger-Pol Droit has called it.2 In line 
with these  preconceptions, Nietzsche rejected the early Buddhism that he knew as 
a life-denying nihilism.
JNS 46.1_01_Braak.indd   2 30/01/15   2:32 PM
Zen And ZArAthustrA 3
Nietzsche’s thought has been extensively received and commented on by 
Japanese philosophers such as Nishitani. But although the comparison between 
Nietzsche and East Asian thought has had a long history in Japan, it is fairly 
recent in the West. Only since the 1980s have some affinities between Nietzsche 
and East Asian thought been pointed out in comparative studies, for example in 
Graham Parkes’s landmark collection Nietzsche and Asian Thought.3 As Parkes 
has observed, “[N]ow that Nietzsche is finally coming into his own is the time 
for a more philosophical engagement with thinkers of those Asian traditions, in 
which dialogue based on correspondences between both sides aims at precise 
elucidation of the divergences. Time, finally, for more of us to cast a trans-
European eye over Nietzsche’s legacy.”4
A confrontation with East Asian thought can help to open up perspectives 
on Nietzsche’s thought, because it takes us beyond the “familiar” Nietzsche. 
There are some gaps in most Nietzsche interpretations that could be fruitfully 
addressed by means of a comparison with East Asian thought. As Roger Ames 
has observed, since Nietzsche is part of our own Western philosophical tradition, 
we all too easily expect him to share with us some unannounced assumptions. 
The seeming exotic nature of East Asian thought can help us to get behind what 
we initially take to be familiar in Nietzsche, only to discover that he too is very 
exotic indeed.5 For example, Nietzsche’s famous declaration of the death of God 
has often been misunderstood as a radicalization of the Western Enlightenment. 
But Nietzsche’s “philosophizing with the hammer” served for him as a prepara-
tion for a revaluation of all values, a return to a life-affirming mode of existence, 
and even a new way of speaking about the divine—as can especially be found 
in his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche was a transcultural thinker who used comparisons with 
non-European philosophical traditions in order to question what we call our 
“own.” He not only used non-Western philosophy to criticize his own Western 
tradition, but also attempted to go beyond it to a more global “world philoso-
phy.” (It is therefore fitting that he has been read widely in non-Western cul-
tures, especially Japan and China.) A comparative study with a non-Western 
philosophical tradition does justice to Nietzsche’s own aspirations to go beyond 
Western philosophy. Nietzsche can be considered a transcultural thinker with 
a self-described trans-European and even trans-Asiatic eye. Therefore, to read 
Nietzsche himself with a trans-European eye (an East Asian eye, even further 
removed from Europe than the Near Asian and Indian eye that Nietzsche had in 
mind) can further elucidate Nietzsche’s work. It must be pointed out, however, 
that there are also substantial limitations inherent in comparing a single (and 
quite iconoclastic) thinker such as Nietzsche with a general category such as 
“Buddhist thought,” or even “East Asian Buddhist thought,” or even “Zen.” 
What is known in the West as the single entity of “Zen” in reality comprises 
a varied and heterogeneous collection of Buddhist traditions in China, Japan, 
Korea, and other East Asian countries, that span about fifteen hundred years.
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An Overview of the East Asian Engagement with Nietzsche
The East Asian engagement with Nietzsche has so far taken place in China and Japan. 
Hans-Georg Moeller has pointed out an interesting dichotomy between Chinese and 
Western types of “Sino-Nietzscheanism.” Chinese interpreters of Nietzsche tend to 
read him as an “individualist,” in line with earlier Western existentialist and human-
ist Nietzsche interpretations (e.g., Walter Kaufmann’s influential interpretation): 
“The ‘individualist’ Nietzsche was quite compatible with the search for an ‘icon’ 
of modern individualism that might provide some orientation within the quest of 
modernizing and strengthening the Chinese nation and culture.”6
Western interpreters, however, no longer read Nietzsche primarily as 
an existentialist, but more as a predecessor of postmodern thought—a 
“pre-postmodernist.” Western Sino-Nietzscheans, such as Parkes and Wohlfart, 
are particularly interested in how both Nietzsche and early Daoism overcome 
subjectivism, individualism, anthropocentrism, and humanism.
Nietzsche’s thought has been extensively studied and interpreted in Japan. In 
the departments of philosophy and religion at the State University of Kyoto, a 
group of Japanese philosophers tried to express Zen Buddhist thought in Western 
philosophical concepts. The initial inspiration of this new movement, which 
came to be known as the Kyoto school, was Kitarō Nishida, widely acknowl-
edged as the foremost modern philosopher of Japan, who took his inspiration 
from phenomenology and William James. Nishida’s student Keiji Nishitani was 
very well read in Nietzsche. Other Japanese philosophers who have published 
on Nietzsche are Abe, Arifuku, and Ōkōchi.7 Bret Davis has followed on from 
Nishitani in his article “Zen after Zarathustra.”8
Nishitani engaged with Nietzsche’s project of overcoming decadence and 
nihilism. Throughout his work, Nishitani sought a resolution to the problem 
of self-overcoming. The Western formulation of the problem was flawed, he 
argued, because the search for self-overcoming remained strictly within the 
realm of the cognitive, the logocentric, and the rational. Zen could enrich 
the search because the breakthrough sought through Zen meditation was one 
that involved the total person and yielded truths about the nature of the self that 
went beyond the cognitive to produce a total experiential realization of the self.9
Nietzsche, Zen, and the West
In an interesting twist of fate (or karma), Nietzsche and Zen have suffered similar 
misrepresentations in their reception throughout the twentieth century.
1. Initially, both were misrepresented as an antiphilosophical mysticism and a 
panacea for an ailing Western culture. Steven Aschheim has documented the 
many Nietzsche cults throughout Europe that claimed Nietzsche’s thought for 
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their own brand of spirituality.10 Zen was presented to the West as a universal 
mysticism that contained the core of all religions without cultural baggage, 
especially through the writings of D. T. Suzuki (or through the way that they 
were misunderstood by a popular audience) and writings such as Nazi philoso-
pher Eugen Herrigel’s bestseller Zen in the Art of Archery.11
2. Just as Nietzsche’s thought was misused by the Nazis, Zen thought was mis-
used by the Japanese government in an effort to justify their war efforts. Both 
were seen as philosophies “beyond good and evil” that justified violence. 
Western Zen priest Brian Victoria published Zen at War (1997), documenting 
nationalism and war crimes by Japanese Zen masters.12 A 1995 publication, 
Rude Awakenings, stressed the need for a critical self-examination within the 
Zen tradition itself.13
3. Both Nietzsche and Zen made a comeback in the fifties and sixties and 
were popular among philosophers, theologians, psychologists, and spiritual 
seekers. In the fifties, Zen was embraced by artists and intellectuals such as 
Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, and Alan Watts, who formed the Beat Zen 
Generation. They embraced a kind of “Nietzschean Zen” beyond good and 
evil, a radical iconoclasm that went beyond all conventions. In the sixties, 
Western counterculture claimed both Nietzsche and Zen in their protest against 
rationalistic Western culture. Nietzsche’s “God is dead” was echoed by the Zen 
dictum “if you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.” Zen was one of the non-
Western philosophies that was invoked as a way of criticizing Western culture.
In a related development, Japanese Zen masters (roshis) came to teach in the 
West (Yasutani, Maezumi, Shunryu Suzuki, Sasaki), and their Western students 
became roshis as well (Richard Baker, Robert Aitken, Philip Kapleau, Dennis 
Merzel, Bernie Glassman, Daido Loori). They emphasized not so much Zen 
philosophy, like the Beat Zen generation, but Zen as a religion, which included 
traditionally and culturally mediated meditation practices such as the sitting 
practice of zazen and koan practice, and all kinds of ritual.
Nietzsche and Zen were strange bedfellows throughout the twentieth century. 
Perhaps in the twenty-first century, a dialogue between them can open up new 
and liberating insights into aspects of their thought that have been undervalued 
and underemphasized.
Nietzsche and Zen as Philosophies of Self-overcoming
Nietzsche and Zen can both be considered philosophies of self-overcoming in 
at least four different respects: theoretical, performative, self-referential, and 
expressive.
nietZsche’s wAy to wisdom And the Zen wAy to enlightenment
The Zen tradition, like Buddhism in general, stresses the importance of self-
overcoming, in order to reach awakening or enlightenment. But also for Nietzsche, 
self-overcoming is one of the most important notions in his philosophy.
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Among Nietzsche’s notebook fragments of 1884, we find a brief outline for a 
book with the title The Way to Wisdom—Hints for an Overcoming of Morality. 
In this fragment, Nietzsche distinguishes three stages as part of the process of 
overcoming morality: “The first stage. To honor (and obey and learn) better 
than anyone. [. . .] The second stage. To break the adoring heart (when one is 
captivated most). The free spirit. [. . .] The third stage. Great decision, whether 
one is capable of a positive attitude, of affirmation” (KSA 11:26[47]).14
These three stages can be seen as three perspectives or modes of experienc-
ing that can be distinguished in Nietzsche’s work. In the first stage, one obeys 
respected authorities and learns from educators, teachers, and examples. One’s 
perspective is heteronomous or other-oriented. The free spirit of the second 
stage has gained independence from others by liberating itself from his adora-
tion of authorities and examples. This perspective can be called autonomous or 
self-oriented. The third stage of unconditional affirmation goes beyond such a 
self-oriented perspective to a cosmic or world-oriented perspective.
The transformations between these perspectives are expressed famously as 
the three transformations of the spirit in the first speech of part I of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, delivered while in the town of the Motley Cow, where the Buddha used 
to deliver his sermons, as Nietzsche was probably aware of.15 On its way to wisdom, 
the spirit first transforms into a camel, a strong, weight-bearing spirit, in which 
reverence dwells. The camel seeks out challenges; it kneels down to be weighed 
down with the heaviest burden. In the desert, the camel transforms into a lion, 
who is able to defeat the dragon of the “thou shalt” by saying “I will” (Z I: “On the 
Three Metamorphoses”). The spirit, that as a camel loved and revered everything 
that it held sacred, now must, as a lion, find delusion and caprice even in the most 
sacred. It discovers that the will to truth, that drove the camel, is actually an illusion.
But even the lion is not capable of creating new values, because it is too iden-
tified with its newfound autonomy of “I will.” It must realize that both “I” and 
“will” are illusory notions. The autonomous self with a sovereign free will is a 
fiction. Therefore the lion voluntarily lets go of its newfound autonomy, and, as 
Nietzsche puts it, “goes under.” It literally overcomes itself and is transformed 
into a child: “innocence is the child and forgetting, a beginning anew, a play, 
a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yea-saying” (Z I: “On the 
Three Metamorphoses”).
Also in the Zen tradition several hermeneutical schemas have been used in 
order to describe the way to enlightenment. A famous one is the three-stage 
schema of mountains and rivers, as expressed for example by Zen master 
Qingyuan (ca. 660–740): “Thirty years ago, before I practiced Zen, I saw that 
mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers. However, after having achieved 
intimate knowledge and having gotten a way in, I saw that mountains are not 
mountains and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have found rest, as before 
I see mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers.”16
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The insight that mountains are not mountains can be interpreted as the 
realization of emptiness (śūnyatā):17 there is no essence to be found anywhere; 
things are not what they seem to be; all “truths” are exposed as merely conven-
tional designations. All searching for truth needs to be left behind; there is no 
truth. The insight that mountains are really mountains refers to the emptiness of 
emptiness, the end of any attachment to the liberating insight of emptiness. This 
results in a restoration of innocence, and an affirmation of the world as it is. The 
result of the first self-overcoming, the negation of truth, needs to be overcome 
as well, in a second negation.
These two conceptualizations of the way to wisdom in Nietzsche and 
Zen have a common structure. Both start with an other-directed perspective: 
Nietzsche’s camel and the seeker after enlightenment initially pursue a way to 
wisdom by following the teachings and instructions from their respective tradi-
tions. For the camel, this is the “thou shalt” that its culture imposes on it. For 
the Buddhist seeker, it is the Buddhist path toward enlightenment (practicing 
meditation, studying texts). Both need to emancipate themselves from such an 
other-oriented perspective. Nietzsche’s camel needs to transform into a lion in 
order to emancipate itself from the dragon of the “thou shalt,” the Buddhist prac-
titioner needs to realize the emptiness of all Buddhist conceptions, and let go of 
enlightenment as a goal that can be realized by seeking anything outside himself.
However, for both Nietzsche and Zen this first crisis is followed by a second 
one: the newfound autonomy of the self-oriented perspective eventually needs to 
be left behind as well, in order to realize a world-oriented perspective. Zarathustra 
declares that the lion needs to “go under” in order to transform into a child. 
The lion’s emancipation from the camel’s heteronomy needs to be followed 
by an “emancipation from the emancipation,” as Nietzsche put it in a letter to 
Lou Salome (KSB 6:247–48). Similarly, the Zen practitioner needs to let go of 
his hard-won realization of emptiness, and awaken to the emptiness of emptiness. 
A second conceptualization of the Zen path, the ten ox-herding pictures, make 
this even more clear. After searching for the ox, capturing it, taming it, and rid-
ing it home (a metaphor for realizing enlightenment), the ox disappears. And 
finally, in the tenth picture, the path culminates in returning to the marketplace 
and effortlessly and unselfconsciously manifesting enlightened activity.
The notion of a culmination of the path in some final state of enlightenment 
sounds teleological, but several Zen thinkers go to great lengths to stress that the 
language of goals and the “in order to reach” have deep limitations. Mahayana 
Buddhism emphasizes that “we are already awoken (original enlightenment).” 
Japanese Zen master Dōgen (1200–1253) coins the antiteleological notion of 
shusho itto (the oneness of practice and realization). He refuses the common 
medieval Japanese Buddhist notion of mappo (the current age is a time of degen-
eration in which the dharma cannot be transmitted anymore) on the grounds that 
the dharma is always already present, and Buddha nature is not something that, 
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presently lacking, will one day come about. Even the most delusional state is, 
from the perspective of Zen mind, utterly full and complete.
From such a third-world-oriented perspective, any preoccupation with one’s 
own condition of enlightenment has evaporated. Any signs of enlightenment, 
of being anything special, have gone. One is simply available, ready to respond 
as needed to the vicissitudes of life, and be of service to life itself.18
in A PerformAtive sense
Nietzsche’s philosophy is not merely abstract or theoretical but rather aims 
at such a self-overcoming in the reader. As Nietzsche remarks, “We have to 
learn to think differently—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even 
more: to feel differently” (D 103). The transformation from one perspective 
to another might be interpreted as learning to think differently, as a relative 
transformation, an emancipation and liberation within the same field of refer-
ence. However, these transformations involve not only a change in cognitive 
outlook—seeing the world differently—but also a process of letting these dif-
ferent ways of thinking sink in and allowing them to change us at the very core 
of our being—experiencing the world differently. They involve learning to both 
think and feel differently. This is what Nietzsche’s intention was in writing Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. As Nietzsche admits in Ecco Homo, his writings after Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra are intended as fishhooks, in order to transform his readers 
so they will be capable of assimilating Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Also, Zen philosophy is not merely theoretical; the aim of any Zen text is 
always to stimulate self-overcoming in the student. Zen criticizes other Buddhist 
schools for being too theoretical and metaphysical. Buddhism has consistently 
declared itself to be, above all else, a soteriology rather than a creed. It judges its 
own doctrines primarily for their transformative power: the truth of a proposition 
consists in its practical utility rather than its descriptive power.
Throughout the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha is referred to as a physician or a 
therapist rather than a philosopher or a theorist. Also Nietzsche refers to himself as 
a physician, whose task it is to lead himself and those rare others who are capable 
of it to “the great health” (or at least prepare the way for the philosophers of the 
future who will be capable of it). Nietzsche refers to the Buddha as “that profound 
physiologist” (EH “Wise” 6). Although Nietzsche thinks that he himself would be 
the opposite of the Indian Buddha, his therapy in fact comes close to Zen therapy.
in A self-referentiAl sense
For Nietzsche, life, conceived as will to power, is that which continually overcomes 
itself. Also as an individual, it is in one’s very nature as a creature of will to power 
that one must continually overcome oneself. Self-overcoming refers to not only 
a process of individual self-enhancement but also self-Aufhebung in a dialecti-
cal sense. Therefore, any philosophy of self-overcoming must also continually 
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overcome itself. And Nietzsche’s philosophy practices what it preaches: it con-
tinually overcomes itself. His experimental philosophy continually contradicts and 
leaves behind earlier positions and perspectives, and goes to great lengths to avoid 
being frozen into a system. Also his views on self-overcoming are continually over-
come. For Nietzsche all perspectives are equally expressions of will to power, nec-
essary preconditions for life. Interpretation, for Nietzsche, is the continual mutual 
confrontation of perspectives, an agonal activity not aimed at agreement, but at a 
continual self-overcoming. Perspectives are continually superseded by new ones.
In Zen, not only Buddhism but also Zen itself is continually overcome. Even 
the Buddha himself needs to be left behind. As the popular Zen saying goes, 
“if you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.” Zen engages in guerrilla warfare 
against any reification of concepts, especially Buddhist ones. Zen stresses 
that enlightenment is nonteleological; it vehemently criticizes early Buddhist 
conceptions of enlightenment as a goal to be reached.
Any comparison between Nietzsche and Zen that would merely point out some 
structural similarities in their conceptions of self-overcoming would be problem-
atic and misleading. Both in Nietzsche’s work and in the Zen tradition, there is a 
tension between such systematic and linear descriptions of a way to wisdom, and 
an ongoing deconstruction and overcoming of such systems. Nietzsche writes 
in a late notebook fragment, “I distrust all systems and systematizers and avoid 
them: perhaps someone will discover behind this book the system that I have 
avoided . . .” (KSA 12:9[188]).
Also the Zen masters continually frustrate any attempts to fix the Zen teachings 
into a coherent system, as is clear from the koan collections that contain interac-
tions between Zen masters and their disciples. In a sense, just like Nietzsche’s 
attempts to undermine the Western philosophical tradition with his aphoristic 
style, the Zen tradition rejects the sutra canon of the established Buddhist tradi-
tions, and replaces it with several aphoristic koan collections.
in A self-exPressive sense
Nietzsche’s affirmative, Dionysian philosophy can be viewed as a celebration 
and expression of self-overcoming. It is a philosophy of laughter and play, what 
Roberts calls “ecstatic philosophy.”19 Also Zen is a philosophy of laughter and 
play that considers the embodiment of self-overcoming as a way toward open-
ness and making room for otherness. Solving a Zen koan means expressing the 
answer to that koan, not coming up with a discursive insight into it.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Reading Thus Spoke Zarathustra is where these four aspects meet each other. It 
is possible to discover a “theory of redemption” in Zarathustra. However, such a 
theoretical reading is too limited by itself. Therefore, it may be more productive 
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to read Zarathustra also as a performative writing, aiming at teaching the reader 
to think and feel differently. Third, any systematic “redemptive” reading of 
Zarathustra proves highly problematic, and reveals many inherent contradictions 
in the notion of redemption itself. Didn’t Nietzsche himself offer as a prayer, 
“redeem us from redemption and all redeemers”? Therefore, Zarathustra is as 
much about the overcoming of redemption as it is about redemption. As a writ-
ing, Zarathustra continually overcomes itself, perhaps even including the fourth 
part, which overcomes the first three parts. And finally, a fourth way to read 
Zarathustra is to view it as an expression of Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy. 
Remember that Nietzsche himself called Zarathustra, no doubt ironically, his 
“fifth gospel.”
Many of these questions about Nietzsche and Asian thought, and about 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, deserve further exploration, perhaps on all four levels 
mentioned in this article. Such a further exploration needs to be not only on a 
theoretical level (discovering new and enriching perspectives). It also should 
result in both thinking and feeling differently. On a self-referential level, perhaps 
any new conclusion or position one might reach on Nietzsche and Zen might 
immediately undermine itself. And as for the ecstatic fourth Dionysian expres-
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